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STUDENT NOTES
NEW

TRIA-THE

ADMISSIBILITY

OF

TESTIMONY

OF

JURORS IN SUPPORT OF A MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL IN KENTUCKY
At early common law evidence given by jurors which impeached
their verdict could be received in support of a motion and grounds
for a new trial.' In 1785 Lord Mansfield in Vase v. Delanel, abrogated this doctrine and laid down the modern rule, followed in a
majority of jurisdictions in this country,3 that the affidavit of a juror
as to his misconduct or the misconduct of his fellow jurors, which
impeaches their verdict, is not admissible in support of a motion for
a new trial.
In discussing the law in Kentucky on this subject one section of
the Kentucky Civil Code' and two sections of the Kentucky Crimmal Code' must be considered. Subsection (2) of section 340 of the
Civil Code provides that "Misconduct of jury, of the prevailing party,
or of his attorney" is a ground for a new trial, but there is no provision in the Civil Code relative to the competency of jurors to
testify, or to the admissibility of evidence to establish the misconduct of the jury as a ground for a new trial. Subsection (3) of section 271 of the Criminal Code provides that, "If the verdict have
been decided by lot, or in any other manner than by a fair expression of opimon by the jurors" such shall be a ground for a new trial.
Section 272 of the Kentucky Crzmznal Code provides that "A juror
can not be examined to establish a ground for a new trial, except it
be to establish that the verdict was made by lot." This is the only
section of either code dealing directly with the subject and it appears to be rather limited in scope. Thus we must turn to the cases
decided by the Court of Appeals to discover its interpretation and
the application of these sections. The cases will be considered in
two general groups, first those cases dealing with the admissibility
of testimony of jurors impeaching their verdict for misconduct or
mistake of themselves or their fellow jurors and second, those cases
dealing with verdicts determined by lot.
'Phillips v. Fowler, Barnes 441, 94 Eng. Rep. R. 994 (1734),
Watts v. Brains, Cro. Eliz. 778, 78 Eng. Rep. R. 1009 (1599)
1 T. R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. R. 944 (1785)
'8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) sec. 2354.
'KENTUCKY CIVIL CODE (Carroll, 1938) sec. 340.
KENTUCKY CRIMINAL CODE (Carroll, 1938) secs. 271, 272.
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CASES OF MISCONDUCT OR MISTAKE
The first case in Kentucky holding that jurors cannot impeach
their verdict by affidavits in support of a motion and grounds for
a new trial was Taylor v. Giger6 decided in 1808. In that case the
affidavits of five jurors were to the effect that they erroneously
understood that a recovery for the plaintiff would be a bar to any
future action for the continuing trespass caused by the damming of
a stream, and therefore assessed the damages abnormally high. In
reinstating the verdict after a new trial had been granted by the
trial court, the Court of Appeals stated,
"1
it has been determined, and we think properly
that affidavits of the jurors ought not to be received to
prove misbehavior in themselves and their fellowjurors, but that wherever misbehavior of a jury is relied on as a ground for a new trial, it ought to be made
out by other evidence.
We can not discover any case where the jurors
have consented to the verdict, and where they have
been permitted afterward, by their affidavits, for the
purpose of impeaching, or setting aside their verdict,
to explain the train of reasoning, or the grounds either
of law or fact assumed by them, inducing that consent.
Such a practice, if tolerated, would be extremely
dangerous
The court, however, did point out that the affidavits of jurors might
be received to show there was in fact no verdict or that the jurors
or part of them did not agree to the verdict rendered.
Since this case it has been firmly established that affidavits
of jurors that they did not understand the instructions;' were
mistaken as to the effect of their verdict;" or were -mistaken as to
the amount that could be or should have been awarded' may not
be received by the court to impeach their verdict when considering a motion and grounds for a new trial. The fact that the jurors
received and considered evidence improperly, from their own investigation," from rumors," from newspapers," or from other
GKy. (Hardin) 595 (1808)
Mills v Commonwealth, 223 Ky 165, 3 S. W 2d 183 (1928),
Caldwell v Spears & Son, 186 Ky. 64, 216 S. W 83 (1919) Tabler
v Jones & Brown, 12 Ky L. Rep. 189 (1890), Russell v Gollady, 2
Ky. Opin. 236 (1868)
Cadle v McHargue, 249 Ky. 385, 60 S.W 2d 973 (1933).
"Hood v Spitzlberger, 242 Ky 291, 46 S.W 2d 102 (1932) Waitman v Marksberry, 200 Ky 1, 254 S. W 432 (1923)
Eversole v.
White, 112 Ky. 193, 65 S. W 442, 23 Ky L. Rep. 1435 (1901)
1 City of Covington v. Parsons, 258 Ky. 22, 79 S.W 2d 353
(1935)
Pollack v Southern Ry Co. 220 Ky. 302, 295 S. W 150
(1927)
Sizemore v Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 46, 224 S. W 637
(1920), Rager v. L. & N. R. Co., 137 Ky. 811, 127 S. W 155 (1910)
Jones Adm'r. v L. & N. R. Co., 108 S. W 865 (Ky 1908) Steele's
Heirs v Logan, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. Marsh.) 394 (1821).
"Ralston
v. Dossey, 289 Ky. 40, 157 S. W 2d 739 (1941)
12
Irvine v. Greenway, 220 Ky 388, 295 S. W 445 (1927)
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improper sources,' 3 or that they considered or discussed improperly admitted evidence," or discussed improper remarks of counsel,'" even though such may be a ground for a new trial, cannot
be established by affidavits or other evidence given by jurors.
Where the verdict rendered is so ambiguous that its true meaning can not be ascertained, the jurors rendering it may not be
recalled to explain the meaning intended," but the court and
counsel may rely on the record.'" Persons not members of the
jury may not give evidence of the misconduct of jurors gained
from the members of the jury as a ground for a new trial, for
such evidence not only violates the rule that jurors may not
impeach their own verdict, but also violates the hearsay rule.'
But persons not members of the jury may give evidence of the misconduct of the jurors, if the information was gained direct from
competent sources and not from the jurors themselves.'" There is
some dictum in the Kentucky cases which would indicate that
affidavits of jurors might be received to establish the fact that a
juror on vozr dire falsely answered or failed to answer a question,
which if truly answered would have rendered him incompetent
to serve as a juror, and thereby impeach the verdict.' Even
though affidavits of jurors may not be used to impeach the verdict
rendered by them, such affidavits may be used in the prosecution
of persons who have attempted to tamper with the jury." Affidavits of jurors as to their good conduct or to their lack of misconduct may always be received to sustain their verdict." The rule
against the admissibility of evidence by jurors impeaching their
' 3 Holladay v. Holladay, 294 Ky 540, 172 S. W 2d 36 (1943)
Allen v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky 302, 28 S. W 2d 19 (1935), Borderland Coal Co. v. Kerns, 171 Ky. 626, 188 S. W 783 (1916).
"McDowell v Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 680, 269 S. W 1019
(1925).
"Byers' Adm'r. v. Hines, 194 Ky. 488, 239 S. W 783 (1922)
"1Cadle v McHargue, 249 Ky. 385, 60 S.W 2d 973 (1933),
Romans v. McGinms, 156 Ky. 205, 160 S. W 928 (1913) Alexander
v. Humber, 86 Ky 565, 6 S. W 453 (1888)
"Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry Co. v. Darlington's Adm'x. 129 Ky
266, 111 S. W 360 (1908).
"Dunbar v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 263, 232 S. W 655 (1921)
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky 458, 222 S. W 940 (1920).
" Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Crawford, 155 Ky. 723, 160 S. W
267 (1913), Gleason v Commonwealth, 145 Ky 128, 140 S. W 63
(1911).
'3Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758, 795-798, 57 S. W 2d 969, 984
(1933), Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 544, 549-551, 283 S. W 385,
388-389 (1926)
Borderland Coal Co. v. Kerns, 171 Ky 626, 631,
188 S. W 783, 785 (1916).
-'Doran v. Shaw, 19 Ky. (3 T. B. Mon.) 411 (1826)
-Tate v Shaver, 287 Ky. 29, 152 S. W 2d 259 (1941) Smith's
Adm'x. v Middlesboro Electric Co., 164 Ky. 46, 174 S.W 773 (1915),
Gleason v. Commonwealth, 145 Ky. 128, 140 S. W 63 (1911) Howard v. Commonwealth, 69 S. W 721 (Ky. 1902).
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conduct in the jury room applies to grand juries as well. as petit
juries.'
As was suggested in Taylor v. Giger ".there is one class of
cases wherein affidavits of jurors in support of a motion and
grounds for a new trial may be received, that is, when there was
in fact no verdict, or the verdict rendered was not the verdict
reached by the jurors. There have been many attempts to bring
cases within this exception,' but a dilligent search reveals but
one case wherein the exception was applied. In Youtsey Bros. v.
Darlington," eleven jurors agreed to a verdict for the plaintiff,
but the dissenting juror drew up the verdict and mistakenly or
otherwise drew it in favor of the defendant and the eleven jurors
signed it without noticing that it was not the true verdict reached.
The verdict for the defendent was rendered in open court and was
not questioned at the time. Upon discovering the error, the counsel
for the plaintiff secured the affidavits of the eleven jurors that
the verdict rendered was in fact not the verdict agreed on and
based his motion for a new trial on the grounds set out in the
affidavits. The trial court received the affidavits in evidence and
granted a new trial. In approving the action of the trial court
in granting a new trial the Court of Appeals stated,
"But affidavits of jurors are admissible to show
that the verdict as received and entered of record by
reason of mistake does not embody the true finding
of the jury.
While the rule is that a new trial
should not be granted on this ground, unless on clear
evidence, the facts were sufficient here to grant the
new trial. Otherwise there would be no way to correct a mistake of this kind."
VERDICT BY LOT
Verdicts by lot may be divided into two general classes, first,
those arrived at by pure chance, such as tossing a coin or drawing
a number from a hat, and second, those arrived at by adding together the number of years sentence, in a criminal case, or the
amount to be recovered, in a civil action, which each juror believes should be the verdict and dividing the total by twelve; this
is commonly known as a "quotient" verdict. Verdicts arrived at
by lot are intimately connected with the admissibility of evidence
of jurors to impeach their verdict because it would be practicaly
impossible to establish the method by which the verdict was reached except by affidavits or other testimony of the jurors.
The invalidity of the first type of verdicts, those arrived at
by pure chance, can easily be established in Kentucky because
I Commonwealth v 'Skeggs, 66 Ky (3 Bush) 19 (1867).
2'3 Ky. (Hardin) 595 (1808).
"Alexander v Humber, 86 Ky 565, 6 S. W 453 (1888) Johnson v Davenport, 26 Ky. (3 J. J. Marsh.) 390 (1830).
233 Ky. 112, 25 S. W 2d 44 (1930).
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section 272 of the Kentucky Crimmnal Code provides that jurors
may be examined to establish that fact. This section has been held
applicable to civil actions as well as criminal cases.' A search of
the books failed to reveal a case of this type that has reached the
Court of Appeals in Kentucky, although they have arisen in other
jurisdictions.'
To establish the character of the second type of verdict, that
is, that verdict rendered is a quotient verdict, presents a more
difficult problem. The admissibility of the testimony of jurors to
the effect that the verdict rendered was arrived at by the quotient
method depends on whether or not the method used for the conduct
of the jurors was such as would make the verdict one arrived at by
lot and thus come under section 272 of the Criminal Code. If the
jurors agree that each will put down the amount which he believes the plaintiff should recover or the number of years the
accused should be confined, that the twelve numbers will be added
together and divided by twelve and agree zn advance that the
result will be their verdict and that they will be bound thereby,
then it is deemed that the verdict has been arrived at by lot and
affidavits of jurors may be introduced to establish that fact.Y The
fact that all the jurors agreed that the accused was guilty or that
the plaintiff should recover and the quotient method was used
merely to ascertain the amount of the verdict does not affect the
operation of this-rule2° If, however, each juror agrees to put down
the amount of recovery he thinks the plaintiff should have or the
number of years confinement to which the accused should be
sentenced, to add them together and divide the total by twelve,
but does not agree to be bound by the result, and each juror adopts
the quotient as his verdict as a result of independent and subsequent consideration, then it is deemed that the verdict was not
arrived at by lot and the affidavits of the jurors may not be received in support* of a motion for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was arrived at by lot.3 As in the case of misconduct,
the testimony of jurors may be received to support the verdict by
-L. & N. R. Co. v. Marshall's Adm'x., 289 Ky 129, 158 S. W 2d
137 (1942).
2
sVogt v Curtis, 200 Wash. 692, 94 P 2d 761 (1939), Donner v.
Palmer, 23 Cal. 40 (1863).
'L. & N. R. Co. v. Marshall's Adm'x., 289 Ky. 129, 158 S. W 2d
137 (1942), Paducah and Elizabethtown R. R. Co. v Commonwealth,
80 Ky. 147 (1882) But see Redmon v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 333
(1884).
'Walton v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky 393, 3 S. W 2d 764 (1928)
Bennett v. Comhonwealth, 175 Ky 540, 194 S. W 797 (1917)
" Choate v. Commonwealth, 176 Ky 133, 195 S. W 1080 (1917),
Heath v. Conway, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 398 (1809) see Cox v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 391, 74 S. W 2d 346 (1934) Walton v Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 393, 3 S. W 2d 764 (1928)
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showing that it was not arrived at by lot. 12 Quotient verdicts generally have been criticized by the Court of Appeals ' and it has
been held to be an error to instruct the jury that they may arrive
at a verdict by the quotient method if they cannot otherwise
agree.'
CONCLUSION
The rule that the testimony of jurors may not be received to
impeach their verdict is manifestly the only safe rule by which
the jury system can be preserved. The rule of Youtsey Bros. v.
Darlington,' that affidavits of jurors may be introduced to show
there was in fact no verdict, or that the verdict rendered was not
the verdict agreed on, should not be followed even though it is
now recognized as a valid exception to the general rule. The
reasons for protecting a verdict from attack by the jurors rendering it have been well stated by the court in Borderland Coal Co. v.
Kerns&
"The rule not permitting verdicts to be impeached by the testimony of a member of the jury as to
what occurred while the verdict was being considered
with the exception stated (verdict by lot) is one designed to protect the sacredness of the jury system, as
well as the stability of verdicts, and to give some assurance of a final determination of litigation. It belongs to that class of subjects to which the door should
be closed against all inquiries, upon the theory that
an adherence to it would serve the cause of justice
better than would a different rule allowing the deliberations of the jury to be investigated."
The temptation to the losing party to tamper with the jurors
after the verdict has been rendered is so great that a contrary
rule would lead to dangerous results which would eventually
destroy the jury system. The possibility of injustice resulting from
powerful and wealthy but unscrupulous litigants, upsetting adverse verdicts under a contrary rule far outweighs the possibility
of injustice under a conclusive rule that jurors may not impeach
their own verdict except that it was made by lot.
WILLIAM

H.

COLDIRON

Walton v Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 393, 3 S. W 2d 764 (1928),
Clark v Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 620, 257 S.W 1035 (1924), Bennett
v Commonwealth, 175 Ky. 540, 194 S. W 797 (1917).
'Cox v Commonwealth, 255 Ky 391, 74 S. W 2d 346 (1934),
Walton
v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky 393, 3 S. W 2d 764 (1928).
'
Allard v. Smith, 59 Ky (2 Met.) 297 (1859)
' 233 Ky 112, 25 S. W 2d 44 (1930).
'171 Ky. 626, 631-632, 188 S. W 783, 785-786 (1916).

